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Abstract: The spot pricing scheme has been considered to be resource-efficient for providers and cost-effective for
consumers in the Cloud market. Nevertheless, unlike the static and straightforward strategies of trading on-
demand and reserved Cloud services, the market-driven mechanism for trading spot service would be compli-
cated for both implementation and understanding. The largely invisible market activities and their complex
interactions could especially make Cloud consumers hesitate to enter the spot market. To reduce the com-
plexity in understanding the Cloud spot market, we decided to reveal the backend information behind spot
price variations. Inspired by the methodology of reverse engineering, we developed a Predator-Prey model
that can simulate the interactions between demand and resource based on the visible spot price traces. The
simulation results have shown some basic regular patterns of market activities with respect to Amazon’s spot
instance type m3.large. Although the findings of this study need further validation by using practical data, our
work essentially suggests a promising approach (i.e. using a Predator-Prey model) to investigate spot market
activities.
1 INTRODUCTION
The de facto Cloud market employs three types
of pricing schemes for trading on-demand service, re-
served service, and spot service respectively. With
the on-demand service pricing scheme, Cloud con-
sumers pay a fixed cost per service unit on an hourly
basis for necessary on-demand resources, and an anal-
ogy of this pricing scheme is paying per view from
a video on demand (VOD) service. With the re-
served service pricing scheme, Cloud consumers pay
an upfront fixed fee to ensure discounted hourly pric-
ing for a long-term commitment of service availabil-
ity, and an analogy of this pricing scheme is signing
a two-year subscription of mobile service to receive
cheaper data plans with a free phone. These two types
of static pricing schemes both imply a straightfor-
ward demand-resource relationship when consuming
Cloud services. In contrast, the spot pricing scheme
depends on potentially complicated interactions be-
tween consumer demand and Cloud resource. As
specified by Amazon (Amazon, 2015a), the price of
Cloud spot service could frequently vary driven by
a market mechanism. An analogy of this pricing
scheme is the dynamic pricing in the electricity dis-
tribution industry. Behind the price variations, tech-
nically, a Cloud spot service continuously evaluates
its available resources and monitors the coming de-
mands, and then dynamically sets spot prices to target
predefined goals like revenue maximization or utility
efficiency.
Given the generally low utilization of Cloud re-
sources (Delimitrou and Kozyrakis, 2014), although
the two static pricing schemes are dominant trad-
ing strategies in the current Cloud market (Al-Roomi
et al., 2013; Xu and Li, 2013), spot pricing has been
considered to be a significant supplement for building
a full-fledged market economy for the Cloud ecosys-
tem (Abhishek et al., 2012). However, it seems that
both providers and consumers are still hesitating to
enter the Cloud spot market. In fact, considering the
hard-to-predict and dynamic interactions between de-
mand and resource, the market-driven mechanism for
pricing spot service would require more effort and
managerial overheads for Cloud providers to imple-
ment, and also result in psychological difficulties for
Cloud consumers to understand and employ (Xu and
Li, 2013). As can be seen, the overwhelming major-
ity of the existing Cloud providers have not employed
the spot pricing scheme yet (Zaman and Grosu, 2011),
and the only spot service provider Amazon is still
using contests to encourage more spot applications
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(Amazon, 2015a).
Therefore, being aware of the dynamic demands
and resources would be significantly helpful and use-
ful for both Cloud providers and consumers to join
the spot market. Unfortunately, the backend details
behind changing spot prices are invisible for most of
the market participants, and little work has focused on
the interactions between demand and resource. Fol-
lowing the methodology of reverse engineering, we
tried to reveal the invisible knowledge from the tangi-
ble spot prices. By imaging the Cloud spot demand
and resource as two species, i.e. predator and prey
respectively, we developed a Predator-Prey model to
investigate the demand-resource interactions. Based
on Amazon’s historical spot prices, the simulation
shows that our Predator-Prey model is conceptually
functional, although the revealed information needs
further validation in practice. This paper introduces
our developed Predator-Prey model and uses its sim-
ulation to try explaining the variations of Cloud spot
price.
The contribution of our work is mainly twofold.
Firstly, this work suggests a promising approach
(i.e. using a Predator-Prey model) to investigate spot
market activities. To our best knowledge, this is the
first study that tries to visualize the interactions be-
tween demand and resource in the Cloud spot mar-
ket. Although the current version of this Predator-
Prey model might still suffer from simple assump-
tions, the logic of the whole work can be reused and
refined by others. Secondly, by using this Predator-
Prey model, our simulation has identified some basic
regular patterns of market activities with respect to
Amazon’s spot instance type m3.large1. For exam-
ple, spot resources could be accumulated relatively
slowly, while being saturated quickly after reaching
particular amounts. Such a phenomenon of sharp
drops of spot resources might indicate “herd behav-
iors” of spot demands. Although this simulation find-
ing could not be practically assured at this current
stage, it have provided us a hypothesis to be tested
in the future.
The remainder of this paper is organized as fol-
lows. Section 2 summarizes relevant studies that have
modeled demand and resource of Cloud spot services
by roughly classifying them into two types. Section
3 elaborates our development details of the Predator-
Prey model of Cloud spot demands and resources. By
using Amazon’s spot price trace, Section 4 describes
our simulation work that reveals basic information be-
hind the changing spot prices. Conclusions and some
future work are discussed in Section 5.
1http://aws.amazon.com/ec2/instance-types/
2 RELATEDWORK
Although the backend details behind spot prices
are usually uncertain and even unknown, the de-
mand information and resource information are fun-
damentally crucial for investigating various prob-
lems ranging from service fault tolerance (from the
consumer’s perspective) to revenue maximization
(from the provider’s perspective). Therefore, re-
searchers and practitioners have employed different
techniques/assumptions to model the spot service de-
mand and resource to facilitate their studies. The ex-
isting study approaches can be roughly classified into
three categories, as specified below.
(1) The first type of studies focuses on Cloud de-
mand and resource separately.
Demand model-relevant studies:
When it comes to modeling demands, a common
practice was to replay recorded workload traces (e.g.,
(Shi et al., 2014)) or to run particular applications
(e.g., (Chohan et al., 2010)). However, this type
of practices would fail in emulating highly variable
and dynamic workload profiles and demand scenar-
ios (v. Kistowski et al., 2014). To address this limit,
a simple case was to treat demand as an indepen-
dent uncertainty parameter that contains the possible
amounts of server-hours required by an application
(Chaisiri et al., 2011). In sophisticated cases, demand
was imagined as job arrivals. For example, Abhishek
et al. (Abhishek et al., 2012) assumed that jobs ar-
rived sequentially according to a stationary stochas-
tic process with independent inter-arrival time, while
Mazzucco and Dumas (Mazzucco and Dumas, 2011)
assumed that jobs entered the spot service according
to an independent Poisson process with a particular
rate λ. Nevertheless, it is notable that these studies
did not consider the influence of dynamic demands
on spot prices in their modeling work.
Resource model-relevant studies:
As for modeling resource, some authors sim-
ply assumed that the Cloud infrastructure could pro-
vide infinite/unbounded spot resource (Chaisiri et al.,
2011; Kantere et al., 2011). However, a spot service
would only offer limited spare resources in practice.
As such, a predefined number of homogeneous pro-
cessors/cores or virtual machines have been widely
used to constrain the amount of spot resources (Maz-
zucco and Dumas, 2011; Xu and Li, 2013). Even
without specification, the spot service models like k
parallel M/M/1 queues (Abhishek et al., 2012) have
also implied limited resources (k VM instances in this
case) in the Cloud spot market. Similarly, this type
of studies did not consider the influence of available
resources on spot prices in their modeling work.
(2) The second type of studies focuses on the re-
lationship between spot price and demand/resource.
Price-Demand model-relevant studies:
Kantere et al. (Kantere et al., 2011) modeled
the price-demand dependency as second order differ-
ential equations with constant parameters, and they
claimed that the involved constant parameters could
be estimated by using price-demand data sets to per-
form curve fitting. As an important economics con-
cept, the stair-shape demand curve has also been used
to represent the relationship between spot price and
quantitative demand. For example, Wang et al. (Wang
et al., 2013) employed a demand curve to facilitate
their time-average revenue maximization study. The
demand curve was supposed to be maintained by sort-
ing the requests according to their bids in a descend-
ing order, as shown in Figure 1. An interesting fea-
ture of this work is that the supply S is defined as the
accepted demand D at a particular time slot, which
partially emphasizes the relationship between demand
and resource of a spot service.
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Figure 1: Sample demand curve (an adapted version from
(Wang et al., 2013)). The horizontal axis essentially scales
accepted demands in the original study.
Price-Resource model-relevant studies:
The connection between spot price and resource
has usually been reflected and/or modeled by using
service availability. For example, the lifetimes of spot
resources were modeled by building a Markov Chain
with edges being the probability of hourly-interval
price transitions (Chohan et al., 2010), which is es-
sentially an availability model; on the other hand, the
rate of events that terminate application runs due to re-
source unavailability was considered to follow an ex-
ponential distribution (Jangjaimon and Tzeng, 2013),
which essentially indicates an unavailability model.
(3) The third type of studies considers the compe-
titions among market participants from the perspec-
tive of economics.
In these studies, Cloud spot pricing was treated
as various auctions and games to reach some equi-
librium. For example, the Prisoner Dilemma game
and the Generalized Nash Equilibrium (GNE) game
was employed to formulate the conflicts between a
provider and its consumers (Di Valerio et al., 2013;
Karunakaran and Sundarraj, 2013). The games and
auctions can intuitively explain the influences of spot
price and demand/resource on each other, as shown in
Figure 2. However, the equilibrium tends to show a
static relationship between demand and resource in-
stead of reflecting their dynamic interactions along
the time goes by.
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Figure 2: Cloud spot pricing from the perspective of eco-
nomics (originally appears in (Li et al., 2015)).
Overall, despite the discussions in common sense,
to the best of our knowledge, little work has focused
on the interactions between demand and resource in
the Cloud spot market. Our work tries to reveal
the invisible demand-resource information through a
Predator-Prey model.
3 USING THE PREDATOR-PREY
MODEL TO EXPLAIN SPOT
PRICE VARIATION
Recall that spot price may fluctuate in real time
driven by the wax and wane of demands and re-
sources. Given the de facto Cloud spot market, how-
ever, we have little knowledge about the changes in
demands and resources except for the most recent
90-day price trace disclosed by Amazon (Amazon,
2015a). To better understand the market-driven mech-
anism for Cloud spot service, it would be significantly
helpful if the backend information behind spot prices
is also visible.
Since it is impossible for us to capture the real-
time demands and resources in the market, we de-
cided to use simulation to visualize their changes.
Considering that Amazon tends to hold a period of
time between different price points (Wee, 2011), we
regard Cloud spot service as a discrete-time system
(A˚stro¨m and Murray, 2008). As such, if viewing the
interaction between demand and resource as the rela-
tionship between predator and prey by analogy with
the two-species ecological system, then it would be
natural to employ a Predator-Prey model to realize the
simulation.
It is notable that, for investigating ecological sys-
tems, the birth and/or death rates are key compo-
nents in any form of Predator-Prey model (Berryman,
1992). Therefore, we start from determining the birth
and death rates of spot service demand and resource
before building the model.
3.1 Birth Rates of Demand and
Resource
Inspired by the explanations in (Xu and Li, 2013), we
define the “birth” of demands as new request arrivals,
which is expressed as a Poisson process with rate
f (p), and the birth rate f (p) represents the amount
of spot resources requested per unit time; while defin-
ing the “birth” of resources as the leave of satisfied
requests and the release of available resources, which
also follows a Poisson process with rate g(p), and the
birth rate g(p) represents the amount of spot resources
released per unit time.
Mainly following the assumptions in the previous
work (Xu and Li, 2013), we treat the assumed demand
arrival and departure rate functions as demand and re-
source birth rate functions respectively for the poten-
tial Predator-Prey model, as shown in Equation (1)
and (2).
f (p) = k× b
√
1− pa (k > 0,a> 1,b> 1) (1)
g(p) = k× (1− b
√
1− pa) (k> 0,a> 1,b> 1) (2)
When it comes to setting values of the parame-
ters, we reuse the example value 5 for k (Xu and Li,
2013) while resetting a and b to be 3. In particular,
the value of k constrains the ceiling amount of new-
born demands or resources, while setting a and b to
be 3 can relax the transformed spot price p over an
interval wider than [0,1] if necessary. Note that, to
match the birth rate functions, we transform original
spot prices by dividing them by their corresponding
fixed (on-demand) price. Take Amazon’s spot service
for example, since spot prices of a particular instance
type could be unexpectedly higher than the fixed price
(Wee, 2011), some high spot prices would be greater
than 1 after transformation, as demonstrated in the
middle column of Table 1. In this case, the greater-
than-one prices imply a clear discouragement to spot
resource employment. In addition, without loss of
generality, the bigger value of a and b can make the
birth rate functions better align with “the common
psychology” emphasized in (Xu and Li, 2013), as
shown in Figure 3: consumers would quickly lose fi-
nancial incentives to use spot service when its price
is approaching the fixed price, while their demands
may not be sensitive to the price variation when spot
service is far cheaper than the on-demand option.
Furthermore, this transformation is more rational
than standardizing spot prices into the interval [0,1],
because the standardization will lose the comparabil-
ity between spot prices and their corresponding fixed
price. To reduce the noise of the birth rate functions
when the transformed price p is higher than 1, we fur-
ther round p to 1 if p> 1 (cf. Table 1).
Table 1: Transforming Spot Prices of Amazon’s Instance
Type M3.large
Original Spot
Price po (USD $)*
Transformed
Spot Price p
Rounded p
0.043 0.279 0.279
0.1 0.649 0.649
0.14 0.909 0.909
0.15 0.974 0.974
0.228 1.481 1
0.5 3.247 1
The fixed price of instance type m3.large is $0.154.
* The data are from the same price trace as illustrated
in Figure 5.
3.2 Death Rates of Demand and
Resource
The “death” of both demand and resource reflects the
consumption of Cloud spot service. We define that
resources are “dead” as soon as they are being con-
sumed; and demands are “dead” as soon as they are
being serviced, without waiting for their satisfied mo-
ment.
To determine the demand death rate α and re-
source death rate β, we resort to three intuitive as-
sumptions.
(1) We consider 80% as the death rate for resource
if there are more than acceptable amount of de-
mands, i.e., β = 0.8. In fact, due to the possible
risks of SLA violation and the inevitable main-
tenance, Cloud providers would not be interested
in a resource utilization that approaches 100%
(Pu¨schel et al., 2007). On the contrary, an aver-
age resource utilization of 80% has been widely
considered to be optimal (Pu¨schel et al., 2007;
Wescott, 2013).
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(a) Demand birth rate function: f (p)= k× b√1− pa, k=
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(b) Resource birth rate function: g(p) = k × (1 −
b
√
1− pa), k = 5, a= 3, b= 3.
Figure 3: Demand and Resource birth rate functions in the
Cloud spot market (an adapted version from (Xu and Li,
2013)).
(2) If the demands are not enough to saturate the opti-
mal service capacity, the amount of dead resource
would be equal to the amount of dead demand. In
other words, the resource death rate would be less
than 80% in this case.
(3) Inspired by the Pareto distributions (80-20 rule)
(Newman, 2005), we also set 80% as the death
rate for demand no matter whether or not the de-
mands are beyond the optimal service capacity,
i.e., α= 0.8. To unify both situations, we suppose
that some out-of-capacity demands would eventu-
ally give up employing the spot service, and thus
they can also be considered to be dead although
without being serviced. In this case, it is still pos-
sible to assume only 20% of demands left for re-
bidding for the spot service in the next round.
In summary, we set the death rate to be 80% for
both spot demand and resource.
3.3 Predator-Prey Model of Demand
and Resource
Based on a timeline of spot price variations, we de-
sign the intuitive logic behind a Predator-Prey model
for recursively exhibiting the amount of demand and
resource, as shown in Figure 4. In detail, we use
D(t) and R(t) to refer to the amounts of residual
demand and residual resource respectively at time
t; while D(t +∆t) and R(t +∆t) respectively repre-
sent the amounts of new demand and resource af-
ter a period of time ∆t since t. In particular, ∆t in-
dicates the time span between two price-adjustment
points. Taking Amazon as an example, interestingly,
its spot service’s prices used to be adjusted hourly
(i.e. ∆t = 1 hour) (Wee, 2011), while the spot price
change frequency becomes multiple times per hour
recently (i.e. ∆t < 1 hour) (Guo et al., 2015). Note
that here we consider the Predator-Prey model by fol-
lowing the logistic thinking of “principle of popula-
tion” (Berryman, 1992) instead of reusing the differ-
ence equations that require interaction terms (A˚stro¨m
and Murray, 2008). In other words, we claim that the
interaction between demand and resource has been re-
flected by using their both birth and death rates.
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Figure 4: Using a timeline to design the logic behind a
Predator-Prey model for spot demand and resource.
By further specifying the logic items with the pre-
defined birth and death rates, we define the Predator-
Prey Model of demand and resource in the Cloud spot
market, as shown in Equation (3).
D(t+∆t) = D(t)+ f (p)×∆t
−D(t)×α∆t
R(t+∆t) = R(t)+g(p)×∆t
−min(D(t)×α∆t,R(t)×β∆t)
(3)
To keep a consistent order of magnitude with
the predefined values for those birth rate functions
(cf. Fig. 3), we set the initial amounts of spot de-
mand and resource both to 5 at the starting point, i.e.,
D(0) = 5 and R(0) = 5. Furthermore, we assume that
the price adjustment happens every unit time inter-
val, and the unit time intervals have uniformly regular
sizes, i.e. ∆t = 1 without necessarily considering the
unit representation. As such, the impact of time inter-
val ∆t can be ignored when calculating both the birth
and the death of spot demands and resources.
Overall, an example setting for initializing the pa-
rameters of this model is specified in Equation (4).
f (p) = 5× 3
√
1− p3
g(p) = 5× (1− 3
√
1− p3)
D(0) = R(0) = 5, α= β= 0.8, ∆t = 1
(4)
4 SIMULATION USING
AMAZON’S SPOT PRICE
TRACE
Given particular initialization settings (e.g., Equa-
tion (4)), this Predator-Prey model can generate de-
mand and resource simulations corresponding to spot
price traces. To facilitate simulation, we implement
the Predator-Prey model into executable codes, as
specified in Algorithm 1. This straightforward al-
gorithm also shows that replicating our study would
not be difficult. When it comes to the spot price
trace, we use Amazon’s Command Line Interface
(CLI) tool ec2-describe-spot-price-history (Amazon,
2015b) to collect historical spot prices of the in-
stance type m3.large whose price has relatively fre-
quent fluctuations at the time of writing. For the pur-
pose of conciseness, we only select a typical piece of
data (spot price records between 2015-03-12 00:01:10
and 2015-03-16 09:23:56) in the collected full trace2,
as illustrated in Figure 5. Note that not all the his-
torical spot prices can be used to generate reasonable
simulations. Only frequently oscillating price traces
can fit in our Predator-Prey model. In fact, a piece of
flat price trajectory might indicate a lack of demands
during that time period, and therefore leading to few
demand-resource interactions. Such a scenario cannot
employ any Predator-Prey model, because it deviates
from the natural Predator-Prey rules.
Following the consecutive time series in the se-
lected price trace, the sequential amounts of demand
and resource can be calculated along with the chang-
ing spot prices, as plotted in Figure 6. As mentioned
2The complete spot price trace with 24000 records
of spot instance type m3.large has been shared on-
line: https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/
1mBUItaGwsa44J5_DHLS0H_mh9QLKjOQPTl7Oq7aiuAc/
Algorithm 1 Demand-Resource Interaction Simulation
Input: Array of historical spot prices P =
(p1, p2, p3, ..., pt), initial demand amount d0, initial
resource amount r0, birth rate factors a,b,k, demand death
rate α, resource death rate β.
Output: Array of demand amount D = (d1,d2, ...,dt),
array of resource amount R= (r1,r2, ...,rt).
1: function DBR(p) . Demand birth rate at price p
2: f ← k× (1− pa)1/b
3: return f
4: end function
5: function RBR(p) . Resource birth rate at price p
6: g← k× [1− (1− pa)1/b]
7: return g
8: end function
9: dt ← d0 . Initial current demand amount at time t
10: rt ← r0 . Initial current resource amount at time t
11: dt+1← 0 . Initial new demand amount at time t+1
12: rt+1← 0 . Initial new resource amount at time t+1
13: D← /0∪d0 . Initial array of demand amount
14: R← /0∪ r0 . Initial array of resource amount
15: for j = 1,2,3, ..., t do
16: dt+1← dt +Dbr(p j)−α×dt
17: rt+1← rt +Rbr(p j)−min{α×dt ,β× rt}
18: D← D∪dt+1
19: R← R∪ rt+1
20: dt ← dt+1
21: rt ← rt+1
22: end for
23: return D,R
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Figure 5: Amazon’s spot price variation trace between
2015-03-12 00:01:10 and 2015-03-16 09:23:56 (instance
type: m3.large, OS type: Linux/UNIX, zone: us-east-1b).
previously, we use the rounded transformed prices for
the calculations (cf. Table 1). It is clear that, although
we have made simplifying assumptions for building
this Predator-Prey model, the simulation here can still
help reveal basic information behind spot prices. For
03
6
9
12
15
1 51 101 151 201 251 301 351
A
m
o
u
n
t
Price Variation Points
Demand Resource
Figure 6: Demand and Resource simulation correspond-
ing to Amazon’s spot price variation trace between 2015-
03-12 00:01:10 and 2015-03-16 09:23:56 (instance type:
m3.large, OS type: Linux/UNIX, zone: us-east-1b).
example:
• Consumer demands remain at a low level when
the spot service is generally expensive.
• Spare resources remain at a low level when the
spot service is generally cheap.
• Spot resources would gradually be released rather
than a burst when the spot service is becoming
expensive.
• In contrast, the spot service capacity could
quickly be saturated by attracting demands at low
spot prices.
The first two simulation findings are aligned with
our common sense, while the others require further
validation in practice. In particular, the frequent
sharp drops of resources revealed by the fourth find-
ing might indicate the regular herd behaviors of spot
demands. Originally, herd behavior refers to a typical
phenomenon when a group of individuals act collec-
tively without centralized direction, and it could hap-
pen among animals as well as humans (Braha, 2012).
By analogy, the herd behavior of spot demands could
result from the same behavior of users when bidding
for cheap Cloud spot resources. Although it is diffi-
cult to make validation at this current stage due to the
lack of practical data, we can treat this explanation as
a hypothesis to be tested in the future.
5 CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE
WORK
Among the three typical pricing schemes in the
de facto Cloud market, spot pricing has been widely
accepted as the most resource-efficient strategy for
Cloud providers and the most cost-effective option
for Cloud consumers. Nevertheless, the spot pric-
ing scheme seems not to be popular yet for trading
Cloud resources, because the market-driven mecha-
nism for pricing spot service would be complicated
both for providers to implement and for consumers
to understand. Despite limited historical spot prices
disclosed by Amazon, the existing spot market activ-
ities are generally invisible especially for Cloud con-
sumers.
To help better understand the operations in the
Cloud spot market, we developed a Predator-Prey
model to visualize the potential demand-resource in-
teractions based on the available spot price traces.
The simulation study has revealed some basic infor-
mation behind spot price variations, and also pro-
posed a hypothesis guiding us in future validation.
Overall, our work essentially shows that utilizing a
Predator-Prey model could be a promising approach
to reversely engineer spot market activities.
However, there is still a lack of practical data to
validate our simulation findings. Such a limitation
drives our future work along two directions. On the
one hand, we will gradually improve our Predator-
Prey model by employing relatively solid assump-
tions. For example, more sophisticated mathematical
models can be used to represent the death rates of de-
mand and resource. On the other hand, we will try to
extract useful demand and resource data from work-
load traces, and conduct workload characterization to
verify the findings of this study.
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